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Post-Imperial Peacekeeping 
RIUissia in the CIS 
Introduction 
What do Russian peacekeeping operations 
look like? Are they comparable to 
international peacekeeping operations? Has 
Russia's experience with peacekeeping 
mirrored that of other countries over the 
1990s? How have Russian operations 
evolved over the last decade? Finally, what 
role do Russian operations play in promoting 
or obstructing conflict resolution in the 
former Soviet Union? 
The range of these questions serves to 
highlight that Russian peacekeeping has been 
understudied compared to the activities of 
other states and regional/international 
organizations.' Since the first Russian 
operations in 1992, sufficient time has passed 
for an overview of Russia's approach to 
peacekeeping. Moreover, ten years after 
these initial deployments, it is possible to 
assess the impact of Russian peacekeeping on 
the conflicts themselves. At the outset, it is 
worth noting that Russia also played an 
important role in international operations in 
the Balkans throughout the 1990s, notably in 
IFOR!SFOR and KFOR. Despite serious 
political disagreements prior to the 
deployment of these operations, in all, 
Russia's participation has been positive for all 
parties. However, the focus of this paper will 
carry on the former Soviet Union where most 
Russian operations have occurred. Russian 
peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space also 
draws out the particular nature of operations 
deployed in a self-declared sphere of vital 
interests and without significant monitoring 
by the international community. 
The paper will start with a brief outline of 
Russian peacekeeping operations to date. 
Secondly, the argument will examine how 
Russian operations fit with traditional and 
contemporary international practice, both in 
terms of the debate on peacekeeping that 
emerged in the 1990s as a result of difficulties 
encountered on the ground and in terms of 
actual practice in conflict zones. Thirdly, the 
paper will discuss the evolution of Russia's 
peacekeeping policy towards the former 
Soviet Union. At the wider level, Russian 
policy has shifted away from its initial active, 
even coercive, engagement in post-Soviet 
conflicts towards a more reactive approach 
to peacekeeping. This evolution has run in 
parallel with wider changes in Russian policy 
towards more pragmatic engagement in the 
former Soviet Union, both in terms of the 
objectives pursued and the tools used in their 
pursuit. Finally, the paper will examine the 
impact of Russia's operations on conflict 
resolution in the region. 
Outline of operations 
Russia has deployed peacekeeping operations 
in four conflicts outside its borders in the 
former Soviet Union since 1992. In June and 
July 1992, Russia deployed peacekeeping 
forces in the internal conflicts in Moldova 
and Georgia with their respective separatist 
regions of the self-declared Pridnestrovskaya 
Moldovaskaya Respublika (PMR, hereafter 
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referred to by the Moldovan name of 
Transnistria) and South Ossetia. These 
operations were deployed on the basis of 
agreements on a cease-fire and the creation 
of security zones between the parties to the 
conflicts. Subsequently, Russia deployed 
troops within the framework of operations 
that received an official mandate from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
The peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan 
was approved by the CIS in September 1993. 
This operation drew on Russian armed forces 
already deployed in Tajikistan, specifically 
units from the 201" motor-rifle division based 
in Dushanbe, and was initially complemented 
by limited contingents from Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Russian-
led operation deployed between Georgia and 
the separatist region of Abkhazia in 1994 
also falls within the purview of the CIS. 
In Georgia and Moldova, peacekeeping 
operations were deployed after a cease-fire 
agreement between the warring sides and 
with their consent and cooperation. Russia's 
presence in Tajikistan, however, comes under 
the CIS Collective Security Treaty of May 
1992. The May 1992 treaty provides for 
mutual support in case of external aggression 
against one of its signatories. This throws 
interesting light on how Moscow defined the 
conflict in Tajikistan in the early 1990s -less 
as a civil war and more as aggression against 
Tajikistan by forces based in Afghanistan. In 
fact, there was a proposal in the run-up to 
the decision to create the CJS peacekeeping 
operation to call it a "defence force" with no 
reference to peacekeeping. In any case, the 
mandate of the Tajik operation has drawn on 
a collective security treaty, imparting to it 
from the start a non-consensual nature, as a 
bulwark to the regime in Dushanbe. 
No matter the mandate, each post-Soviet 
operation has been dominated by Russian 
troops, led by Russian commanders, 
6 IFS Tnfo 2/03 
organized on Russian military principles and 
directed by the Russian Ministry of Defence 
(MOD). The participation of reduced 
battalions from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
K yrgyzstan in the initial stages of the CIS 
operation in Tajikistan did not dilute Russia's 
operational dominance. 
The size of these peacekeeping operations 
has been quite limited and decreased with 
time. The operation in Abkhazia stands now 
at about 1600 strong (with 140 APCs and 
four helicopters)-' This is about half the size 
of its initial deployment of three thousand 
troops. 3 In 2002, Russian troops were based 
at twenty-six observation posts in the 
security zone on either side of the Inguri 
River, as well as at three command posts. 
The Russian contingent in Moldova is 
composed of two battalions (800), reduced 
from an initial level of 1800. In South 
Ossetia, Russia has about 500 troops 
deployed, again half the size of the initial 
deployment. Russia's 201" Motorized 
Infantry Division (in total around 7,500 
troops based in Tajikistan) provides the core 
to the CIS peacekeeping operation in 
Tajikistan. The division has a thousand 
troops deployed in eleven strategic directions 
on the Tajik-Afghan border and guarding 
vital objects inside the country. In addition, a 
rapid reaction battalion has been created 
within the division to provide support for 
Russian border troops (which stand at 
around 11,000 strong) in case of incursions 
from Afghanistan. 4 
Russian operations are not constrained by 
clear withdrawal timetables, rules of 
engagement or operationally defined 
mandates, principally due to the military's 
insistence on maintaining control without 
intrusive civilian oversight. This lack also 
reflects the ad hoc nature of Russian 
operations, in particular of those initiated in 
1992, deployed in crisis moments, using 
troops already in and around the conflict 
zones and drawing on already established 
chains of command. As much as possible, 
Russian operations have been manned by 
specially trained troops. In the early 1990s, 
the MOD designated two divisions for 
peacekeeping purposes - the 2 7'" and the 
4 5'". Moreover, a peacekeeping training 
center was created at Totskoye. In practice, 
however, training and troop composition has 
been haphazard and scrambled. Until 2001, 
the airborne forces played a lead role in 
Russian operations, often acting 
independently from other troops on the 
ground, with different chains of command 
and control, such as in Abkhazia. 
With pressing internal needs in the second 
Chechen war, Vladimir Putin has changed 
this. In mid-2001, peacekeeping 
responsibilities were transferred to the 
Ground Forces.5 The 45'" division has been 
transformed into the 138'" motorized infantry 
brigade to fight in the North Caucasus. In 
September 2001, the 27'" division was 
brought under the Volga-Urals Military 
District. New command arrangements for 
peacekeeping and a training center are 
reported to be in the making. As a result, the 
future of the Airborne 245'" training center 
for peacekeeping operations at Ryazan is 
uncertain. In all of this flux, Russian 
peacekeeping has lost its most well trained 
troops, as well as momentum and continuity 
in its operations. 
Legally, Russian peacekeeping operations 
must be composed of professional forces. 
This is not the case in practice in Moldova or 
Abkhazia.6 The 201" division in Tajikistan is 
in theory a fully professional force. In 
practice, as admitted by the 201" 
commander, Major-General Valentin Orlov, 
the quality of officers and soldiers in the 
division varies greatly.7 The support and 
provision to all Russian troops has been 
deplorable - they receive irregular and 
limited supplies in fuel or food. Moreover, 
command and control over these forces from 
Moscow is loose (except for the airborne 
troops which had a parallel chain of 
command for their forces), most often 
delegated to the lowest level but by default. 
The lack of central support and guidance to 
peacekeeping troops has led to a range of 
problems that will be discussed later. 
As noted already, Russian operations have 
reflected two patterns. First, Russian 
operations in Moldova and Georgia have 
consisted of quite traditional inter-position 
exercises deployed on clearly defined 
geographic lines (as will be seen, these 
operations also contain important 
differences). The level of force used by 
Russian and other troops in these operations 
has been very limited, with the peacekeeping 
troops acting as a deterrent to any serious 
violation of the cease-fire regime. This 
deterrent role is far from successful with 
regard to less serious and daily violations. It 
has also failed to prevent large-scale 
violations, as witnessed in the so-called "six 
day war" that occurred in the Abkhaz 
security zone in the May 1998 when 
skirmishes between Abkhaz security forces 
and Georgian "partisan" groups led to the 
displacement of some thirty thousand ethnic 
Georgians from the Gali region. In general, 
these operations perform very basic 
traditional tasks, maintaining static posts in 
the security zone without engaging in mobile 
patrols.8 
The CIS operation in Tajikistan is different. 
This operation represents a collective 
security measure in support of a pro-Russian 
government in Dushanbe. As such, the 
peacekeeping troops played an active role in 
the civil war between 1992-1997, supporting 
the government and bolstering the defence of 
the Tajik-Afghan border. Since the peace 
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treaty struck in 1997, the operation has 
continued in its primary role of bolstering the 
border and supporting the government in 
Dushanbe. 
Peacekeeping is a dangerous activity for 
Russia, with over 400 killed and more 
wounded as a result of these operations. The 
most dangerous operations remain those in 
Abkhazia and Tajikistan. In March 2002, for 
example, peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia 
skirmished with Georgian "partisan" groups, 
which are active in the security zone, and 
four peacekeepers were kidnapped.' 
Moreover, peacekeeping does not come free 
for Russia, especially as Moscow has 
shouldered the main burden of these 
operations, whether CIS or trilateral. Total 
peacekeeping costs in 2001 reportedly stood 
at around 80 million dollars, only one fourth 
of which was devoted to post-Soviet 
operations.10 However, salary arrears to 
Russian troops have built up in every 
operation, with some estimates of millions of 
dollars owed to Russian peacekeepers in 
Abkhazia alone, so the estimated overall 
costs are probably too low." 
This outline highlights the ad hoc nature of 
Russian peacekeeping operations. These 
operations have had different kinds of 
mandate provided by different sources and 
types of organization. They are composed of 
a variety of troops with differing levels of 
training, as well as different chains of 
command. In all, Russian operations do not 
reflect an organized programme following 
clear mandates and peacekeeping doctrines, 
instead varying according to the nature of 
the conflict, the requirements perceived by 
the Russian government and the resources 
available to Russia at the time of 
deployment. 
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Russian and international experience 
There are similarities between Russian and 
international peacekeeping practice, in 
particular with regard to the operations in 
Moldova and Georgia. Peacekeeping in 
Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
resembles traditional United Nations 
peacekeeping operations, with troops 
deployed in observation posts on a clear 
separation line between the warring parties, 
after a cease-fire agreement and with the 
consent and cooperation of the parties. 12 At a 
stretch, even the CIS operation in Tajikistan 
may be compared to the wider and more 
comprehensive operations undertaken by the 
international community in the 1990s that 
included a heavy peace-enforcement 
dimension. However, fundamental 
differences obscure such similarities. 
First, it is important to note that Russia has 
barely participated in the series of debates 
that occurred at the international level 
throughout the 1990s about the nature of 
peacekeeping." An internal Russian debate 
did take place. However, its lines differed 
from wider international discussions, leaving 
Russian operations sitting largely on the 
sidelines of the wider European!international 
expenence. 
Soviet experience in Afghanistan and the 
military interventions that occurred in Baku, 
Tbilisi and Vilnius are the starting point ro 
Russian discussions. 14 The conclusions drawn 
from these experiences varied. Much of the 
debate in Russia occurred between 1992 and 
1995. While a distinction must be made 
between civilian and military views, the 
debate crossed institutional lines." An 
important, if minority, section of the Russian 
High Command portrayed peacekeeping as a 
form of combat activity, drawing upon Soviet 
experience during the war in Afghanistan 
and Russian counter-insurgency in the civil 
war in Tajikistan. For example, in 1993, Lt.-
Colonel G. Zhilin praised the forceful 
military intervention of Alexander Lebed, as 
commander of the Russian 14'h Army, in 
halting the fighting between Moldovan and 
Transnistrian forces. 16 Zhilin concluded his 
discussion by stating that "the military 
strength of the peacekeeping forces and their 
preparation for decisive action must be such 
that the opposing sides immediately lose their 
desire to continue war", with any group 
breaching the cease-fire to suffer a 
"devastating strike". 
However, more moderate voices in the 
military leadership and the government 
dominated the debate. While recognizing the 
role of force in peacekeeping, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) presented 
peacekeeping as the legal via media between 
unilateral coercion and genuine non-
intervention in the newly independent 
statesYThe MFA argued that peacekeeping 
had to be integrated into a coherent strategy 
that, Russia's first Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev argued, had to "combine firmness 
with restraint and subtlety in its approach" .1' 
In his view, Russian policy had to juxtapose 
political and diplomatic measures with the 
"carefully considered application of 
economic and military force[ ... ] within the 
framework of the law" .19 Russia's second 
Foreign Minister, and subsequent Prime 
Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, also understood 
peacekeeping as mainly a political activity, 
where the use of force was allowable when 
combined with a range of other policies, 
specifically diplomatic and economic. At the 
same time, Primakov was more outspoken 
than Kozyrev on the degree of force that 
could be undertaken in peacekeeping. In the 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone, Primakov 
called more than once for a more forceful 
and active role for Russian forces, and not 
only in cases of self-defense. Certainly, 
Primakov was able to act on the MFA's 
understanding of peacekeeping where 
Kozyrev was never able. Primakov restored 
the MFA as the leading agency in policy 
towards the conflicts beyond Russia's 
borders. Under his tutelage, a peace treaty 
was agreed in June 1997 to end the civil war 
in Tajikistan, significant progress occurred in 
the negotiations in Moldova and an increased 
Russian role was visible in the Georgia-
Abkhazia conflict. This has continued under 
Igor Ivanov, albeit with less governmental 
attention than Primakov had brought to bear. 
Russian peacekeeping doctrinal concepts 
may be compared with the international 
spectrum approach to peace support that 
emerged in the second half of the 1990s.20 
Indeed, the Russian Defence Ministry has 
developed concepts to guide training and 
operations that follow similar lines.21 
However, in practice, Russia has not applied 
a spectrum peace support approach, limiting 
operations to traditional inter-position 
exercises. Even in Tajikistan, Russia has 
sought to retain a limited operational profile. 
Secondly, there are major operational 
differences between Russian and 
international peacekeeping. Some of these 
have been noted already- their ad hoc 
nature, the lack of standard rules of 
engagement and withdrawal timetables 
(although admittedly some UN operations 
during the 1990s also lacked these 
attributes). In addition, Russian operations 
have integrated the warring parties into the 
operations themselves. This solved a number 
of potential problems for Russia. First, Russia 
would have faced difficulty filling the ranks 
of the peacekeeping operations without the 
participation of the conflicting parties. Given 
the degree of animosity in this conflict, which 
ruled out their participation in joint 
peacekeeping, Russia was forced to take full 
material responsibility for the operation. 
Second, Russia sought to build local 
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cooperation and consent into the operation 
by including the parties in it. The Russian 
government has even presented this method 
as a model to be emulated by the 
international community to solve the 
dilemma of ensuring ongoing cooperation to 
an operation in difficult circumstances. 
Thus, in South Ossetia and Moldova, there 
are reduced battalions of South Ossetian/ 
Georgian troops and Moldovanl 
Transnistrian troops acting under Russian 
command in the peacekeeping operation. 
This arrangement is overseen by a Joint 
Control Commission that also brings together 
the parties to the conflict and Russia, the 
commanders of the peacekeeping forces and 
other observers in weekly meetings to review 
activities and recommend actions. 
Another important difference with 
international practice has been Russia's use 
of troops already deployed in or around a 
conflict zone as peacekeeping forces. In 
Moldova, the former Soviet 14'h Army (now 
a much-reduced Russian Operational Group) 
has adopted a peacekeeping role, despite its 
past history as a base of support to 
Transnistrian separatist forces. In Abkhazia, 
the Russian Airborne regiment deployed in 
Gudauta before the war lay at the heart of 
the peacekeeping operation set up in 1994. 
Similarly, the operation in Tajikistan has 
drawn on parts of the Russian 201" division 
deployed there by the Soviet Union. These 
arrangements mark the post-colonial nature 
of Russian peacekeeping, with troop 
compositions reflecting the legacy of the 
Soviet armed forces scattered throughout the 
former Soviet Union. 
Certainly, the presence of forces already 
near conflict zones allowed Russia to react 
quickly to crisis and conflict situations. The 
proximity of Russian troops, combined with 
their past experience in the Soviet Union, has 
also meant that some of the problems 
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associated with foreign troops being 
deployed in conflicts where they hardly speak 
the local language and have very little 
experience have been attenuated in the 
Russian case. However, this proximity has 
also created problems, as Russian forward 
deployments are deeply tied to their local 
communities by residence and family links. In 
the case of the former 14'h Army, this may 
explain some of the support provided to 
Transnistria by the Russian military as many 
officers' and soldiers' families live on the left 
bank of the Dnestr. The problems in 
Abkhazia were different. Russia's initial 
peacekeeping force was drawn from the 
Airborne regiment deployed in Abkhazia and 
Russian troops in Georgia proper, which 
were part of the Group of Russian Forces in 
the Transcaucasus. The different 
geographical origin of these forces was 
reflected in different perceptions by them of 
the parties on the ground, with contrasting 
sympathies to the Abkhaz and Georgian 
causes from different parts of the Russian 
operation. 
Most fundamentally, Russian operations 
are not UN or OSCE mandated operations. 
The legitimacy of Russian operations flows 
from the CIS imprimatur provided in the 
Tajik and Abkhaz cases, and from the 
consent of the parties in South Ossetia and 
Moldova. Alongside Russian!CIS operations, 
the UN and OSCE have deployed observer 
missions to oversee developments in the 
conflicts, promote dialogue and also to 
monitor the activities of the Russian/CIS 
peacekeepers. At the formal level, 
mechanisms of cooperation have been set up 
between Russian/CIS operations and 
international missions that include 
international oversight. In practice, the 
interaction between Russian troops and 
international observers on the ground has 
varied from slight in Moldova to more 
significant in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
In Moldova, an agreement on 'Principles of 
Cooperation between the OSCE Mission and 
the Joint Control Commission in the Security 
Zone' was reached on July 20, 1994 and 
updated on January 16, 1996. These 
agreements allow the few OSCE Military 
Observers to patrol the security zone and 
participate in the weekly Joint Control 
Commissions. However, free movement in 
the security zone is allowed only with prior 
notice to the local authorities and 
peacekeeping command. Full participation in 
the JCC also relies on the invitation of the 
parties. In practice, the OSCE has been 
limited by the reluctance of Transnistria to 
allow for significant oversight.'2 Russia-
OSCE cooperation has been much more 
positive in South Ossetia, with the OSCE 
integrated more deeply and actively in 
monitoring activities and the Joint Control 
Commission." In Abkhazia, the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
(UNOMIG) has played an acrive role in 
monitoring Russian peacekeeping activities in 
the security zone. UN Observers have 
developed a good working relationship with 
Russian peacekeepers on the ground.24 
The greatest difference between Russian 
and international practice resides in the fact 
that Russian operations are not deployed to 
advance "international peace and security", 
although this may be one of their declared 
secondary goals. According to Russia's first 
Military Doctrine of November 1993, and 
reiterated ever since, Russian operations are 
deployed to advance Russian state interests -
this is their primary objective. Troop 
deployments by a former imperial power in 
its ex-empire are altogether different to 
international peacekeeping. Russian 
operations have sought consistently to alter 
the prevailing distribution of power in these 
conflicts in a way that would advance 
Russian state interests. As such, Russian 
peacekeepers are more "players" than 
''referees". 
Evolution ofRussian peacekeeping 
Most fundamentally, therefore, the policy 
context has distinguished Russian operations 
from international practice.25 Between 1992-
1994, Russian peacekeeping forces were 
deployed after the direct involvement of 
Russian troops already present in these 
conflict zones. Russian troops based in 
Moldova and Abkhazia provided support to 
the separatist forces, a support that reflected 
the local ties of Russian soldiers as well as 
weaknesses in Russian command and 
control. At the wider level, Russian 
operations were deployed as part of a policy 
that sought to re-establish various levels of 
hegemony over the new states that emerged 
on Russia's borders after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. In these first years, Russian 
policy juxtaposed peacekeeping with other 
tools of pressure to advance Russian interests 
in Moldova and Georgia, two states bent on 
striking independent paths from Moscow, 
and in Tajikistan, where a pro-Russian 
government was fighting a civil war with 
opposition forces based in Afghanistan. 
After a few years of policy debate and 
inconsistency, a consensus had emerged in 
Moscow by 1994 on the use of peacekeeping 
as a means to advance Russian security in a 
post-Soviet space that was threatening to 
Russian interests, whether in the shape of a 
Russian population living in the conflict 
zones or because of the fear of conflict spill-
over into the Russian Federation itself. The 
Russian leadership claimed special 
responsibility for maintaining peace and 
stability in the region. In Moscow's view, 
Russian operations were also justified by the 
UN Charter as occurring through a CIS 
regional arrangement. The Russian 
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government indeed has referred to Chapter 
VIII of the Charter on the rights and 
responsibilities of regional arrangements for 
the maintenance of international peace and 
security through such non-enforcement 
activities as peacekeeping operations. 
Moreover, there was a broad agreement on 
the role of these operations to promote 
stability on Russia's borders and to prevent 
the emergence of a security vacuum in the 
region. Peacekeeping was tied to Russia's 
pursuit of its interests throughout its self-
declared "special zone of responsibility". 
This consensus was reinforced by the 
emergence of an informal division of labor 
between the Foreign and Defence Ministries. 
In practice, the MOD assumed responsibility 
for all military and operational aspects of 
Russian approaches towards these conflicts, 
with a Deputy Defence Minister, Georgy 
Kondratiyev, assigned to lead in these 
responsibilities, while the Foreign Ministry 
was increasingly sidelined to a role of 
conveying rather than formulating policy. In 
addition, during this period, Russian 
operations developed difficult relations with 
the UN and the OSCE on the ground. Any 
extensive involvement by the international 
community was viewed as a threat to 
Russian influence. In the Autumn of 1993, 
Andrei Kozyrev made Russia's position clear: 
It would be a mistake to ignore the role of the UN 
and the CSCE. but abandoning this sphere to the 
organizations e.:r:clusive(v would constitute the 
other extreme. This is a zone of Russian interests 
and all the parties understand this and turn to 
Russia. :6 
A combination of four factors from late 
1994 onwards led to changes in Russian 
peacekeeping by 1996. First, the Chechen 
war, launched in December 1994, depleted 
the level of resources available for 
peacekeeping, placing pressure on Moscow 
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to cur back on forward deployments beyond 
its borders in the former Soviet Union. 
Second, the difficult experience of using 
military force to quell Chechen separatism 
reinforced the more moderate views of 
peacekeeping held by the Russian leadership, 
as opposed to the hard-line views held by 
some parts of the military High Command, 
and strengthened Russia's emphasis on latent 
and passive peacekeeping. Thirdly, in 1996, 
Boris Yeltsin replaced Andrei Kozyrev with 
Yevgeny Primakov as Foreign Minister and 
dismissed Pave] Grachev as Defence 
Minister. The appointment of Primakov, a 
respected "centrist", bolstered the weight of 
the Foreign Ministry in decision-making in 
Moscow at a time when the Defence 
Ministry was devoting all of its energies to 
the war in Chechnya. Finally, Russian 
security policy thinking came increasingly to 
recognize that the main threats to Russian 
security were internaJ.27 Especially after 
1998, a combination of economic dislocation 
and financial collapse led the Russian 
government to seek to secure a predictable 
international environment conducive for 
Russia's internal revitalization. 
Under Primakov's leadership, the Russian 
government sought to redress the balance 
between political and military strands of 
peacekeeping to emphasize political conflict 
resolution. This was most successful in 
Tajikistan, where Primakov secured a peace 
agreement in June 1997 between the main 
parties to the conflict on the basis of a power-
sharing arrangement. Moreover, Russia was 
more willing to work with international 
peacekeeping efforts on the ground in the 
CIS, in order to share the political and 
material burden of responsibility. 
All of these trends accelerated under the 
leadership of Vladimir Purin. At the broad 
level, Russian peacekeeping policy has 
become less exclusive and less coercive. First, 
under Putin, decision-making on foreign and 
security policy has become more firmly 
centralized, making Russian policy almost as 
presidential as the 1993 Constitution would 
allow. The president himself has taken a lead 
in making key shifts in Russian policy 
towards the former Soviet Union, such as 
during his visit to Azerbaijan in January 2001 
and subsequent relations with President G. 
Aliyev. 28 Putin has led from the front in 
Russia's alignment with the United States in 
the "war on terror" since September 11. 
Greater coordination has lent a 
concentration to Russian foreign policy that 
was lacking throughout the Yeltsin period of 
leadership.29 
Secondly, Putin's government has reiterated 
the priority dangers posed by internal threats 
to Russian security. As Secretary of the 
Security Council and then Defense Minister, 
Sergei lvanov has stressed the wide range of 
internal threats, which act to weaken the 
state and the Russian constitution.30 Much 
more than Yeltsin, however, Putin has shown 
himself determined to act on this priority. The 
second Chechen war reflects if anything 
Putin 's resolve to restore Russia's internal 
situation to some degree of order, even at 
great cost (and short term disorder). Beyond 
Russia's borders, this has translated into a 
foreign policy that has sought to reduce 
Russia's international presence while 
preserving as much as possible its influence 
and the status quo. 
In the former Soviet Union, Russian policy 
has eschewed the coercive use of force as a 
tool of policy and moved to reduce Russia's 
forward basing. In a review conducted in 
2001 shortly after his appointment as 
Defense Minister, Sergei !vanov announced 
the start of large-scale reductions of Russia's 
military basing abroad.31 Some of these cuts 
fall in line with Russian obligations incurred 
at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul to 
withdraw the Operational Group from 
Moldova and withdraw from the bases in 
Vaziani and Gudauta in Georgia. Other 
reductions have included Russia's wirhdrawal 
from Cam Ranh Bay and Cuba, as well as 
the withdrawal of airborne troops from the 
Balkans and cuts in Russia's overall 
participation there. More broadly, Putin's 
government has made better use of economic 
and political ties of interdependence with the 
newly independent states to advance Russian 
interests, decreasing the role played by the 
military. Russian retains an interest in the 
separatist areas as means of pressure, against 
Moldova and Georgia. However, the tools 
employed by Moscow are less exclusively 
military now. For example, in both 
Transnistria and Abkhazia, the Russian 
government has launched a programme of 
providing certain separatist citizens with 
Russian passports, much to the dismay of 
Moldova and Georgia. 
In addition, Russia has been more willing to 
work with international organizations acting 
in the former Soviet Union. Interaction has 
increased with the OSCE in Moldova and 
South Ossetia, and the United Nations in 
Abkhazia. Russia under Putin has been an 
active player in the Minsk Group talks over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. More dramatically, 
Putin accepted (with gritted teeth) the 
deployment of US forces in the Central Asian 
states. On a subject that is much closer to the 
Russian border, Putin stated about that the 
US announcement of a Train and Equip 
programme to support the development of 
the Georgian armed forces: "This is no 
tragedy, and no can there be. Why is it 
permissible in Central Asia and not in 
Georgia?" 32 
These wider shifts have also affected 
Russian peacekeeping in the former Soviet 
Union. The start of a withdrawal of the 
Operational Group in Moldova and the 
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airborne regiment in Gudauta, Georgia, has 
reduced the overall number of troops Russia 
has available in and around the conflict 
zones. 33 These forces acted as powerful 
deterrent for the poorly armed peacekeepers, 
leaving them now bereft of this "last resort" 
support. These cuts also mean that Russia 
depends on an enduring peacekeeping 
presence in order to retain a military foothold 
in these two states- in this sense, 
peacekeeping has retained strategic 
importance. At the same time, serious 
pressures are building on Russian operations, 
in particular in Abkhazia and Tajikistan. The 
cost of these operations is not insignificant at 
a time when the government has launched a 
large-scale military reform programme. 
Moreover, these troops have remained under 
constant threat from "partisan" groups in 
Abkhazia and instability in Tajikistan. It is 
unlikely that Russia will withdraw from 
peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union. 
However, further rationalization of Russia's 
presence may be expected, as might also a 
far greater role for the international 
community. 
Impact on conflict resolution 
CIS peacekeeping in Tajikistan played an 
important role in creating a climate that was 
conducive to the peace agreement signed in 
1997 between the United Tajik Opposition 
leader, Said Abdullo Nuri, and the Tajik 
President Emomali Rakhmonov. The 
presence of the operation stabilized the 
relation of forces between the two parties so 
much that, combined with the inherent 
geographic difficulties of the mountainous 
country, by 1996 both parties recognized that 
their objectives could not be achieved fully by 
force. Moreover, Russian policy shifted at the 
diplomatic level to place pressure on the 
government in Dushanbe to compromise with 
the Tajik opposition. The positive role of 
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Russian mediation in Tajikistan must be 
recognized, where, in contrast to the conflicts 
in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, a 
fragile peace has been built. 
However, Russian peacekeeping was not 
the primary reason leading to a peace 
agreement in Tajikistan - the nature of the 
civil war itself matters more. By 1996, it was 
clear that the civil war was a struggle not 
over the basic idea of the new state that 
emerged in 1992, but over the distribution of 
power in it. 34 The civil war did not raise 
fundamental or long-standing questions 
about Tajik "stateness". The basic common 
ground on the idea of Tajikness between all 
the parties has been founded, however 
weakly, on a sense of shared history and 
destiny among the Tajik people. This shared 
idea - less Russian peacekeeping - allowed 
power sharing to emerge as a feasible option 
in 1997 for the main elites on both sides of 
the civil war. 35 Certainly, Russian pressure 
for a settlement was vital in securing the 
agreement, as was the push from Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan on Rakhmonov to agree to a 
compromise. The rise of civilian protests 
against the Dushanbe government's failure to 
decrease poverty was an important factor in 
Rakhmonov's thinking. Moreover, both 
parties had reached something of stalemate 
on the battlefield by 1997, neither having a 
real prospect of winning by force of arms. In 
the end, however, despite all of these 
conditioning factors, a power-sharing 
solution would not even have been 
conceivable if some prior common ground 
had not existed on the notion of a Tajik 
identity and state. 
In contrast, the conflicts in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Transnistria, Chechnya and 
Nagorno-Karabakh reflect conflicting 
perceptions of the domain and territory of 
Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Azerbaijan. 
The aim of the separatist groups is not to 
capture power in the metropolitan stares or 
to renegotiate the division of powers within 
them. Their objective is to exit. At the least, 
the aim is to build new relations with it on an 
inter-state level as equal units. The linkage of 
ethnicity with territory has made the 
objectives of these separatist areas state-
orientated. Disagreement over the "idea" 
behind the states that emerged from the 
Soviet co1lapse has made conflict resolution 
very difficult. In contrast to Tajikistan, the 
conflicting parties have no shared notion of 
identity or staehood. 
In Moldova and Georgia, Russian 
peacekeeping forces remain deployed on 
separation lines between the self-declared 
separatist states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
· and Transnistria with the metropolitan states 
of Georgia and Moldova. Most scholarly 
discussions of these conflicts have focused on 
external factors as key obstacles. External 
factors have been, and continue to be, 
important inhibitors to conflict settlement. 
However, the balance of analysis needs to be 
redressed. The focus here wil1 carry first on 
internal factors driving these conflicts.36 
Once the dynamic driving these conflicts, and 
in particular the separatist states, has been 
clarified, it will be possible to discuss what 
role Russian peacekeeping has played in 
reinforcing or weakening the status quo. 
Internal inhibitors 
The amalgam of territory, population and 
government in Transnistria, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia has produced something that is 
greater than the sum of these parts - a deeply 
felt belief in internal sovereignty. The 
insistence on sovereignty has meant that 
settlement will be difficult to be reached 
through federal power-sharing arrangements. 
It is often assumed that the 'statehood' of 
these entities is a resource that they will be 
willing to bargain away once the 
circumstances are propitious. In fact, their 
sovereignty is seen as non-negotiable by the 
separatist authorities. 
The separatist states draw on three sources 
of legitimacy for this belief. First, these 
authorities maintain that they fulfill all the 
empirical conditions for being considered to 
have positive sovereignty. They claim to 
have, and indeed do, a system of political 
leadership that has received popular support 
and provides basic services to a given 
population over a specific territory, over 
which effective control is maintained for a 
significant period of time. Second, the 
separatist authorities draw on what they 
interpret as the broad and unrestricted right 
of self-determination of all peoples. All of 
them have based their claims on popu1ar 
election/referenda that seek to substantiate 
this right - they claim to exist based on 
popular will. The separatist authorities also 
insist on their inherent moral entitlement to 
self-determination when faced with "alien" 
rule from Moldova or Georgia. Finally, the 
state-building projects in these areas are 
founded on the position that the current 
independent states represent but the latest 
phase in a long historical tradition of 
statehood. 
Insecurity represents another internal 
inhibitor to conflict settlement. Fear was the 
factor that gave rise to the conflicts at the 
outset, and it has remained a defining 
condition since. Historica1ly, these separatist 
regions have rarely won wars by themselves 
and for themselves. The cease-fires that were 
reached in the first half of the 1990s froze 
victories that the separatists secured on the 
battlefield. For the moment at least, the self-
declared states have won. However, victory 
has left them bewildered. 
They profoundly distrust victory. All are 
aware that they have won a battle and not 
the war. The example of renewed conflict in 
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Chechnya since 1999 has been edifying. This 
distrust has led these states to elevate self-
defence over all other policy areas. None of 
the de facto states are military-run states. 
However, all of them are devoted to the 
military. They are racketeer states. As 
defined by the historian Charles Tilly, "some-
one who produces the danger and, at a price 
the shield against it, is a racketeer". 37 In some 
sense, all states are '"racketeers", as in an 
anarchic international system the very 
existence of a state, unwittingly most of the 
time, produces a danger from other states 
which the first state then proposes to defend 
itself against- an Escher drawing of 
spiraling insecuriry. In this sense, the 
separatist states are not that different from 
the world of recognized states living with the 
securiry dilemma. However, the dilemma is 
exacerbated with the separatist states, whose 
very existence is driven by the threat posed 
by the state from which they are separating. 
Here lies the dilemma: these regions have 
separated from their metropolitan states 
because of a perceived/actual threat posed to 
them; their continuing existence as non-
recognized states means that the danger of 
their elimination by force is never ruled out. 
In this sense, the separatist regions 
themselves are both the producers of the 
threat to themselves and the shield against it 
- the essence of racketeering. 
In Transnistria, the result of this condition is 
almost absurd. The separatist authorities in 
the Tiraspol base their claim to independence 
on the threat posed to them by Moldova, 
which is presented in the local media and 
political speeches as a revanchist and fascist 
Romania. In fact, the Moldovan military 
threat to the Transnistria is now basically 
non-existent. Nonetheless, this "danger" has 
led to the creation of numerous paramilitary 
forces in Transnistria, as well as an outsized 
securiry ministry, most of which are deeply 
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engaged in criminal activities, thus profiting 
from the "danger" they produce. 
Moreover, fear and insecuriry have meant 
that these states have little faith in the rule of 
law as a means to guarantee their securiry. 
Military power is seen as the only means by 
which to deter Georgia and Moldova from 
seeking to resolve the conflicts by force, even 
if in the case of Moldova there is no intention 
or capabiliry of doing so. This has significant 
consequences on possible settlement options. 
In particular, power-sharing solutions, as in 
Tajikistan, do not seem feasible, as they are 
based on all parties trusting that potential 
conflicts will be resolved by legal 
mechanisms and working constitutional 
arrangements. The separatist authorities 
have no such trust in the protection of the 
law. 
These separatist states are failing states. 
They all have the institutional fixtures of 
statehood but have not been able to provide 
for its substance. The wars they fought in the 
1990s devastated their economies and 
exacerbated the difficulties that resulted from 
the collapse of the Soviet economic system. 
Most of them survive despite living under 
blockade. However, the severe economic 
difficulties that are common to all of them 
have only served to strengthen subsistence 
syndromes, which work to strengthen the 
status quo. These states are driven f1rst and 
foremost by political and not economic 
imperatives. Economic difficulties, massive 
poverry and widespread social dislocation 
are prices they are willing to pay in order to 
attain the political goal of independence. 
Moreover, the status quo provides benefits to 
many of the separatist leaders, which 
strengthen their resistance. In Abkhazia, the 
president's family is involved in the timber 
trade with Turkish groups. A similar mingling 
of political and commercial structures exists 
in the other separatist states. This 
intermingling has become so deeply 
entrenched over the ten years that these 
areas look like vast shadowy enterprises. 
Indeed, many groups inside and outside the 
separatist states now profit from their 
existence: enough people profit enough to 
make the status quo durable. A perverted but 
workable incentive structure has emerged 
over the last decade that sustains the 
separatist authorities and their political 
objectives. 
External Inhibitors 
First, the metropolitan states from which 
these areas have broken away, Moldova and 
Georgia, have played an indirect and direct 
role in sustaining the status quo. Indirectly, 
they are not magnets for their separatist 
regions. Indeed, they emit no force of 
attraction, either of economic prosperity or 
political stability that might lead the 
separatist regions to compromise with them 
in order to benefit from the restoration of 
political and economic relations. Economic 
difficulties, political instability and poor 
human rights records of the metropolitan 
states are disincentives for the separatists to 
compromise. 
Georgia and Moldova also play a direct 
role in sustaining the status quo. The 
existence of non-recognized separatist areas 
within their borders means that they are not 
forced to recognize the defeat they suffered 
on the battlefield in the 1990s, a recognition 
that would challenge political stability and 
threaten the current leadership. For the 
present, they do not have the armed forces 
capable of enforcing their sovereignty over 
the separatist areas. At the same time, they 
are not ready for political reasons to 
compromise with the separatist demands, as 
this would represent accepting defeat. The 
status quo is costly for Moldova and 
Georgia, but it has the advantage of allowing 
them to avoid grasping the nettle of defeat. 
Kinship groups are important sources of 
external support to the separatist areas. In 
Abkhazia, assistance from related peoples in 
the North Caucasus was crucial in the war. 
The Armenian diaspora has been vital in 
reconstructing Nagorno-Karabakh since the 
cease-fire of 1994. International 
humanitarian organizations also strengthen 
the status quo. At the most extreme, in 
Abkhazia, the UN and a variety of non-
governmental humanitarian organizations 
have become pillars of the separatist state, 
providing key services to its society and 
economy. This situation reflects a classic 
dilemma international organizations face in 
balancing human needs in conflicts with 
consideration of the political implications of 
providing support. 
Finally, Russian peacekeeping operations 
contribute to entrenching the status quo. 
Russia's use of peacekeeping as a means to 
advance its own interests has weakened its 
operations' ability to present themselves as 
neutral forces that might ensure security in 
the conflict zones. The fact that Russian 
forces played a role in the conflict, supporting 
either one or the other side, remains at the 
forefront of the security calculations of the 
conflicting parties. As a result, these 
operations have not promoted trust between 
the parties, but only reinforced a prevailing 
sense of distrust. The Moldovan 
government's trust in the security guarantee 
provided by the peacekeeping forces has been 
undermined by Russia's previous support to 
the Transnistrian forces and their permissive 
attitude towards the construction of border 
posts in the security zone in violation of the 
peacekeeping agreement. In Georgia, any 
trust that Tbilisi might have had in the 
Russian peacekeeping operation was 
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destroyed by Russia's passive role in 
providing for the security of IDPs returning 
to Abkhazia and their inaction in May 1998. 
It is common for parties to conflicts to view 
peacekeeping either as a potential tool or an 
obstacle to their ends. This problem is 
exacerbated in the case of Russian 
peacekeeping by its previous explicit use as a 
tool to advance its interests. The logic of war 
in the Abkhaz conflict has been maintained 
by the creation of a de facto border between 
Abkhazia and Georgia, which is monitored 
by Russian troops. In Moldova, Russian 
peacekeeping troops also maintain a division 
separating the parties. Russia's previous 
support to the Transnistrian authorities has 
entrenched the separatist state, which has 
created its own armed forces, border troops 
and state institutions. As a result of this 
experience, the Moldovan and Georgian 
governments have come to view 
peacekeeping itself as an obstacle. 
The recognition by each contesting party of 
the legitimacy of the other party can be a 
critical factor for conflict resolution. Official 
or unofficial Russian support to the separatist 
forces between 1992-1994 reinforced 
Chisinau's and Tbilisi's propensity to reject 
attributing any legitimacy to the separatist 
cause. The separatists are seen as the "fifth 
column" of an aggressive external power-
Russia- bent on recreating its empire. This 
perception has rendered serious negotiations 
on settlement all the more difficult. 
Moreover, these circumstances have 
reinforced the propensity of Georgia and 
Moldova to seek an external mediator - UN , 
NATO, US, EU- that will support their view, 
as a "savior", which will allow them to fulfil 
their maximal aims. 
Russian peacekeeping operations also have 
built-in operational problems that tend to 
strengthen the status quo. In Moldova and 
Georgia, rhe integration of the conflicting 
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parties into the peacekeeping operation has 
led to the lax implementation of the cease-fire 
and security regime. In Moldova, there are 
far too many separatist troops in the security 
zone. In addition, the weekly Joint Control 
Commissions are regulated by consensus 
decision-making. This situation replicates the 
freezing of the UN Security Council during 
the Cold War, as neither party has an interest 
in approving a decision that might favor the 
other. In practice, this has meant that the 
separatist forces have been able to hold off 
more significant international monitoring of 
the security zone and to block the weekly 
agenda of the commission. 
In addition, chronically under-supplied and 
made up of different types of troops with 
different command structures, Russian 
operations are made up of a poorly and 
disorganized bunch. In each conflict, Russian 
troops have become entwined with local 
criminal rackets. On the one hand, these 
troops are responding rationally to a dire 
situation and pursuing atomized survival 
tactics. Clearly though, their involvement in 
smuggling does nothing to enhance conflict 
resolution. 
Finally, the Russian government under 
Putin has not abandoned its perceived 
strategic interests in these conflicts and 
states. The Russian government remains 
intent on maintaining a reduced military 
presence in Moldova and Georgia, even in 
the form of peacekeeping forces. As a result 
the conflicting parties still tend to adopt ' 
positions that either seek to block Russian 
interests or to benefit most from a 
coincidence of their own interests with 
Russian strategy, games that have diverted 
energy away from serious negotiations with 
the other party. 
Conclusions 
Russia's role as a regional stabilizer in the 
former Soviet Union must be recognized. 
Cease-fires have held for close to a decade in 
Moldova and Georgia. A fragile peace has 
been reached in Tajikistan. 
However, despite years of exhaustion, 
conflict resolution has not advanced far in 
the former Soviet Union. Russian 
peacekeeping bears some responsibility for 
these circumstances. Peace is far off in 
Moldova and Georgia, precisely because it 
will be difficult now to rein in the separatist 
states that emerged partly with Russian 
support. Russia cannot be blamed for the 
non-resolution of these conflicts, as they are 
driven by their own inherent logic. However, 
Russian peacekeeping has strengthened the 
status quo. At a wider level, peacekeeping 
has been largely de-legitimized in the former 
Soviet Union. The experience of the last ten 
years has reinforced conflicting parties' 
perceptions of the nature of peacekeeping 
that are not in keeping with traditional UN 
operations developed during the Cold War. 
The self-declared states view peacekeeping 
as border troops to deter a rankling Moldova 
and Georgia. On numerous occasions, the 
Georgian leadership has called for 
'peacekeeping' operations on the lines of the 
Croatian offensive in mid-1995 against 
Serbian-held Krajina - military measures that 
have nothing to do with peacekeeping. In its 
traditional Cold War form, peacekeeping 
assumed a secondary role with regard to the 
more important peace process. In Georgia 
and Moldova, Russian peacekeeping 
operations are primary issues in the peace 
talks. 
Russia has become a major peacekeeper 
with a rich and varied peacekeeping 
experience, running the gamut from 
traditional inter-position to coercive peace 
support. However, Russia has stood largely 
buffered from international experience since 
the end of the Cold War. Russia's 
involvement in the operations in the Balkans 
has not been fed into a learning loop in the 
High Command and political leadership 
about the nature of peacekeeping. Moreover, 
there has been little Russian involvement in 
the international debate about peacekeeping. 
Russia's internal debate has lacked in relative 
depth, with little discussion of civil-military 
relations or the balance between consent and 
force. Peacekeeping experience and doctrine 
figured importantly in discussions between 
NATO and Russia in the Permanent Joint 
Council after 1997. It is clear that far more 
efforts could be devoted to bridging Russian 
and international peacekeeping practice. 
These may occur within the 2002 NATO-
Russia Council as well as in the framework 
of the political and security dialogue that has 
developed between the European Union and 
Russia. 
Finally, the experience of the last ten years 
calls into question the division of labor that 
emerged between international and regional 
organizations in providing for peace and 
security. The observer missions set up by the 
OSCE and the UN to monitor Russian!CIS 
operations have been hampered by deep 
constraints. Most fundamentally, the 
observer missions have been unable to uproot 
the enduring role peacekeeping plays in 
Russian policy in pursuit of its interests. 
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